My work centers around three related topics. First are questions about the general structure of thought and experience, addressed by a priori and phenomenological methods. Second are questions about intentionality. I'm particularly interested in entities like concepts and individual thought-contents, their role as posits to help explain the structure of thought and experience, and the kind of intentionality they must have to do so. Third is the question whether we should expect cognitive scientists to pay any attention to the above, and what in general the relationship is between philosophical theorizing about and empirical research into the brain.
One current project is a defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Abstract: I develop a version of the PCS in response to Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. I argue that phenomenal concepts should be understood as ordinary demonstrative and perceptual concepts, obtained through sensory experience and referring to the physical properties of objects – not to brain states, as in Balog, Papineau, etc. I show that this formulation evades objections usually levelled against the PCS.