I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at Columbia University, working mainly on issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, as well as the philosophy of science generally.
My dissertation is on computational explanation — the strategy that applies concepts and formal resources from computer science and computer engineering to explain systems like brains, DNA, evolutionary processes, etc. I argue that this strategy, as it is actually used in the cognitive sciences, makes fewer and weaker metaphysical assumptions than philosophers tend to assume. This conclusion makes room for a new, scientifically-informed account of how and why computational explanation works (and works so well), both in general and in specific cases. It also provides a framework within which to give plausible accounts of the way representational and teleological notions are used in cognitive science, and causes problems for views in the philosophy of mind that draw support from the (merely) apparent endorsement, by cognitive scientists, of a claim that the brain is, in a metaphysical sense, some sort of computer.
I also have broad interests in the philosophy of science, particularly in psychologism, perspectivism, anti-realism, and the nature of explanation, as well as the philosophy of humor.
You can reach me at andrew[dot]richmond[at]columbia[dot]edu.