My main interests are in questions about the nature and structure of thought, experience, and the self. I'm particularly interested in the various notions of representation in philosophy and cognitive science: what status the various kinds of representation have (are they explanatory posits? data of introspection?); what explanatory work they do in their respective fields; and whether the existence and nature of mental representations can illuminate other problems, e.g. debates over metaphysical realism, or the nature of the self. These concerns also bring me into contact with questions in the philosophy of science, language, and metaphysics.
One current project is a defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. I argue that phenomenal concepts should be understood as ordinary perceptual concepts, obtained through sensory experience and referring to the physical properties of objects. I show that this formulation evades objections usually levelled against the PCS, but only in conjunction with a sort of realism about phenomenal qualities that other versions of the PCS don't adopt. I take this to be a feature, not a bug, and sketch one way that it might help to bridge 1st- and 3rd-person characterizations of phenomenal qualities.