My main interests are in questions about the nature and structure of thought, experience, and the self, addressed by relatively a priori and phenomenological methods. I'm particularly interested in entities like concepts and thought-contents, and the kind of intentionality these entities possess. I'm also interested in the reduction of mental (and normative, agential, etc.) concepts to the kinds of concepts furnished by physical science, particularly in the question of whether something significant is lost in that reduction, and what to do if something is lost. Finally, I'm interested in cognitive science and the role it can play helping both to characterize the structure of thought and experience, and to describe the 'ground' that thought and experience might be reduced to. These concerns also bring me into contact with questions in the philosophy of science, language, and metaphysics.
One current project is a defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. I develop a version of the PCS and argue that phenomenal concepts should be understood as ordinary perceptual concepts, obtained through sensory experience and referring to the physical properties of objects. I show that this formulation evades objections usually levelled against the PCS. Since this version of the PCS relies heavily on the irreducibility of perceptual representations (or perceptual concepts) to the concepts of physical science, I draw some broader conclusions about the role of representation in experience and thought, and make a brief case for a kind of (non-ontological) realism about the entities represented.